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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.

Whether or not it is within the province of the Supreme
Court

of

Utah

determination,

to

and,

review
if

so,

the
to

trier

of

substitute

fact's
its

own

judgment for that of the trial court's.

2.

Whether or not the trier of fact erred in determining
the

weight

and

credibility

given

expert

witnesses,

and, if so doing, ruled contrary to that to which all
reasonable minds would have been persuaded.

3.

Whether respondents are entitled to attorney fees by
reason of appellants' initiating a frivolous appeal.

1
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH BANK, a Utah
banking corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 20,624

KEVIN B. and DARLENE J.
LEANY, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Respondent,

Wasatch

Bank,

acknowledges

the

accuracy

of

appellants1 "Statement of the Case" which delineated the purchase
of real property, the execution of a promissory note and trust
deed in favor of Wasatch Bank, appellants1 failure to meet the
terms,

the

declaration

of

default,

trustee's

sale,

and

the

subsequent trial for deficiency which resulted in the decision
of

the

trial

court,

Judge

Ballif,

awarding

Wasatch

Bank

a

deficiency judgment in the amount of $30,466.91, together with
costs in the amount of $104.38.
Respondent

does,

"Statement of Facts."

however,

take

issue

with

appellants1

Set forth below is respondent's brief

2
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factual summary based upon the trial record; however, areas of
dispute are addressed in detail within respondent's Argument.
On the

23rd

day

of December,

purchase of real property located

1980, to

facilitate

their

in Payson, Utah, appellants

executed a trust deed and promissory note in favor of Wasatch
Bank in the amount of $55,920.
Upon

(R. 4, 5-8; Exhibit 1).

appellants' failure to make payments, Wasatch Bank,

according to the terms of the note, declared due and payable the
outstanding principal and accrued interest.

On May 18, 1983,

appellant received the Notice of Default from Wasatch Bank.
101-2).

A trustee's sale was held on September 20, 1983.

(R.
As of

that date there was due, owing, and unpaid the principal sum of
$55,396.87, together with interest in the sum of $5,769.81.
46, 62-63) .

(R.

On that same date there was accrued as costs and

expenses in exercising the power of sale the amount of $3,382.22.
(R. 46, 62-63).
$64,466.91.

The total due as of September 20, 1983, was

(R. 59, 63).

As of the date of the trustee's sale in September of 1983,
the premises had been inspected and appraised and found to be in
considerable disrepair which was characterized
inadequate and nonhabitable.

as substandard,

It had deteriorated to the point

that the City or County Health Department would not allow anyone
to live in it.

The mechanical systems, such as plumbing, heating
3
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and electrical systems had deteriorated to the point that they
were inoperable.
substandard.

The cosmetic condition of the home was also

(R. 72-74).

At the trustee's sale in September of

1982, Wasatch Bank bid the sum of $34,000.

(R. 63).

Wasatch Bank was in possession of the property from September
20,

1983, until the time that it was resold in May of 1984.

Wasatch Bank replaced broken glass, placed locks on the home and
installed a new roof.
18,

1984,

for

(R. 64) .

$31,500.

The property was resold on May

(R. 68).

After the

resale of the

property, Wasatch Bank handled the disbursements of funds, which
were provided directly for the repairs of the property.
Bank disbursed repair funds in the amount of $41,700.
An

action

for

a

deficiency

judgment

in

Wasatch

(R. 105).

the

amount

of

$30,553.70 was brought by Wasatch Bank against the appellants on
October 28, 1983.

(R. 1-3).

On February 26, 1985, the court

ruled in favor of Wasatch Bank and granted the deficiency judgment
in the amount sought.
26, 1985.

(R. 41-42).

Judgment was entered on March

(R. 49-50).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The

trial

court

heard

the

testimony

of

four witnesses,

admitted documentary evidence and made its determination based
upon its assessment of the weight of the evidence.
only

minor

disputes

and

appellants'

witness,

4
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There existed
upon

learning

additional information at trial, substantially concurred with the
opinion of respondent's witness.
The judge determined that, in any event, the testimony of
respondent's witness was the more believable.
The

Supreme

Court must

only determine

whether

there was

sufficient evidence supporting the judge's factual findings, and
is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the trier
of fact.

The trial record herein clearly shows that there was

more than substantial evidence to justify the determination of
Judge Ballif as the trier of fact.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN APPELLATE COURT CANNOT SUBSTITUTE ITS
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIER OF FACT AND
THUS CAN ONLY REVIEW THE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE
INSUFFICIENCY
RESULTING
IN AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the standard of appellate
review which prohibits the substitution of the Supreme Court's
judgment for the trial court on issues of fact.
This court has consistently followed the
well-recognized standard of appellate review
which precludes the substitution of our
judgment for that of the trial court on
issues of fact, and where its findings and
judgment
are
based
upon
substantial,
competent, admissable evidence we will not
disturb them.

«

l

Fisher v. Tavlor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The evidence was sufficient to sustain the
judgment made, and we should sustain the
trial court even if we might have come to a
different decision had we been trying the
matter.
Wash-A-Matic, Inc. v. R U P P , 532 P.2d 682 (Utah 1975).
The

only

determination

left

to

the

appellate

court

is

whether or not the trial court's factual determinations support
its legal conclusions and whether there was sufficient evidence
upon which to base the factual

findings.

Hidden Meadows v.

Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979).
It is not [the Supreme Court's] prerogative
to
determine
whether
the
evidence
preponderated on one side of the other. That
is a responsibility of the trier of fact. It
is only for us to determine whether there is
substantial evidence in the record to support
the ruling.
Reimschiissel. v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 1982).
Respondent does acknowledge that in matters of equity the
Supreme Court may review the facts with more scrutiny; however,
such review is still limited.
Although this Court may review both the facts
and the law [citation omitted] we typically
accord considerable deference to the judgment
of the trial court due to its advantaged
position and will not disturb the action of
that court unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary, or the trial
court abuses its discretion or misapplies
principles of law. [citations omitted]
Jeppson v. Jeppson, 694 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984).
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Furthermore, considerable deference is given to the trial
judge who was in the advantaged position to see and hear the
witnesses and even if the weight of the evidence appears slightly
in favor of the non-prevailing party, the reviewing court cannot
alter the judgment.
Although
this Court's
statement
of the
standard of review of findings of fact in
equity
cases
have
varied
considerably
[citation omitted] it is most commonly said
that we reverse only when the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings of
the trial court.
[citations omitted]. This
principle is well stated in the plurality
opinion in Nokes v. Continental Mining and
Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d
954:
[T]he finding of the trial court
will
not be disturbed
if the
evidence preponderates in favor of
the finding; nor, if the evidence
thereon is evenly balanced or it is
doubtful where the preponderance
lies; nor, even if its weight is
slightly against the finding of a
trial court, but it will be overturned and another finding made
only
if
the
evidence
clearly
preponderates against his finding.
In substance, this is the same standard
applied in those cases which state that we
reverse only when the trial court's finding
is against the clear weight of the evidence,
[citations omitted].
In applying this standard, we are mindful of
the advantaged position of the trial judge
who sees and hears the witnesses and therefore
give due deference to his decisions. . . .
[citations omitted].
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1980).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IT IS WITHIN THE STRICT PROVINCE uF THE TRIER
OF FACT TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY GIVEN TO EXPERT TESTIMONY AND SUCH
DETERMINATIONS CANNOT BE DISTURBED BY THE
APPELLATE COURT UNLESS ALL REASONABLE MINDS
WOULD HAVE FOUND TO THE CONTRARY
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IT « <S, V-4

The matter of witness credibility also falls
within the province of the fact-finder. When
there is a discrepancy in testimony rendered
by the witnesses, the fact-finder must decide
which account is the most accurate. Then on
appeal, we must review the facts in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party.
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979).
Judge Ballif heard the testimony of Leonel Castillo, manager
of the Real Estate Department at Wasatch Bank, Jud Harward, a
professional

real

estate

appraiser,

Don

Gurney,

also

a

real

estate appraiser, and Kevin Leany, the purchaser and appellant.
All witnesses were subject to proper direct and cross-examination.
(R.

58).

Exhibits

included

the

promissory

note,

seventeen

photographs of the premises in question, an additional photograph,
and an appraisal.

(R. 39). At the close of the case, the matter

was taken under advisement and a decision rendered the following
day, to-wit, in pertinent part:
The Court finds the issues herein in favor of
the plaintiff, Wasatch Bank, and against the
defendants and finds that the fair market
value of the real property at the time of the
trustee's sale did not exceed $34,000 . . .
the Court further finds that the total amount
due on the promissory note, including the
principal balance, accrued interest and costs
of sale, totals $64,466.91, and that the
plaintiff herein bid the sum of $34,000 at
the trustee's sale and is therefore entitled
to
a
Deficiency
Judgment
against
the
defendants for the sum of $30,466.91.
The evidence presented by the Appraiser, Jud
Harward, was the most realistic, and which
the appraiser, Gurnev, agreed with upon
verification of the costs of repair items
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

which were substantially as represented by ;
Harward upon verification b y t h e witness,
Castillo, w h o had paid bills from t h e bank torepair the property in the sum of $41,000
expended by t h e bank and $2,000 b y t h e buyer.
[emphasis a d d e d ] .
(R. 4 1 - 4 2 ) .
- - I' forth
synopsis

:. -:;•>.

:>: .*

of

A » » j^nef

the witnesses

with

--\& re:^-^:

refe?
Testimony

r^-ai

testimony

below

•, •.

-

mil i HI n

HI

mi i

i -ifli

iiiinpen

a

estate appraiser for approximate Ly 15 years arid was irecoc) •
• •--•:• <

.:>-.-- *

"•

Estate Appraisers

': •

American Institute of Real

-

I ot his work u iiv> or i.enlHIi

to bank loam, type properties,

(R, 71) j 1) his fair market value

evaluations were oaseu upon expi irii uuf in i hi oris from true i"'1 iniericam
Institute

Estate Appraisers, upon definitions utilized by

inurt.j,

M'IM tiirt?c recognized approaches ot replacement

ainl upon

i i i s" t"

income'1 • and market

others, lie thoroughly
i. <, n m , mi in

i in

tu

uaJhius approach

examined the property
i|

letec m iiKh-di I mil

• ) «i I

in question
IIHMP

i l lI
in M

existed functional

obsolescence with regard to the floor plan, that the Ujilding was
probably fifty to sixty ypar's -iM, that it was nonhabitable, that
it had deteriorates to m e pnini, i tiaii i lie i n v
Departmen

-lould

plumbi

if. i

not allow

anyone

f(

live

unty Heal,!!!

there,

that the

inn uiecttinal systems had deteriorated to the

point of m o p e r a b i l i t y , that the painting, carpetiiiq and verier a J
cosmetic condition oi the home were substandard,
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mi

(H

N j ,„ 6) he

determined

that

it was

actually

borderline

as to whether to

rehabilitate the home or to destroy it and start with a vacant
lot; however, he decided that there was some salvageable value to
the dwelling and thus the "highest and best use" was to renovate
the property and bring it up to acceptable standards (R. 75) ; 7)
after examining the property, he also went through it with another
individual who determined that based upon the inoperability of
the heating, electrical, and plumbing systems that the unit had
to be completely stripped down to the shell and built back up
again, in other words, the mechanical systems were not salvageable. (R. 76); 8) it was determined that it would take approximately $50,000 to bring the dwelling up to a standard of acceptable housing, (R. 76); 9) he determined that the fair market value
of the property, once brought up to the requisite standard and put
in rentable condition, would be $80,000 and, therefore, the "as
is" value was $30,000, (R. 76-77); 10) it was his opinion that
the fair market value of the premises as of September 30, 1983,
was

$30,000

(R. 77); 11) he

examined

pictures

taken

'• <

of the

premises near September 20, 1983, which pictures were introduced
as exhibits at trial, talked to two other people who examined the

i

property on approximately those dates, and determined that the
condition of the property in September of 1983, was virtually the
same as of May

in 1984, and,

in fact, the condition

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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limited

for

inspect

and h e a t i n q ,

(
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repairs necessary t o bring the property

IIIH

i s " e s t i m a t i o n of

i vail no of

of

items".
repairs

were approximately

$50,000, then his

"as is" appraisal

as of

August of 1983, would have been $20,000, (R. 91); 9) he testified
that at the time of his appraisal he did not know that the heating
system had to be replaced, he did not know that the wiring or
electrical systems had to be replaced, and he did not know that
the plumbing

fixtures needed to be replaced, and that he was

working under the assumption that such systems would be repairable
at a fairly minimal cost and that if it turned out they were not
salvageable, then his estimations were off a considerable amount
of money, for example, $10,000 in the heating system alone, (R.
92, 94); 10) he then testified that having received, at trial, the
actual cost of repair, he did, in fact, agree with Mr. Harward's
appraisal as to the "as is" value on September 20, 1983:
Q:

Having received and now knowing the
actual
cost
figures,
and
what
is
necessary, as far as the property is
concerned, would you agree with Mr.
Harward's appraisal as to his "as is"
value on September 20, 1983?

A:

Yes. I would agree that it would be a
lot closer to that than what I used in
my estimate of the expenses to repair it.
(R. 95.).

Mr.
Department

Leonel

Castillo f

for Wasatch

the

Bank,

manager

testified

of
as

the
to

Real

the

Estate

undisputed

figures regarding the promissory note, the dates, the principal
balance, the accrued interests, the actual cost of the sale, the
bid by Wasatch Bank, and the subsequent sale of the property in
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1984.

Mi

hi h J in

lie iilbn lostif led l:!iHit "Wasatch Bank;, after

the resale of the property

lh

' handle the disbursement ol" funds

tnur went: uniiectTy t m the repairs ml I he property, and that the
amount disbursed was $41, 11 m
ap

1'iditional

I . C I i L i d u t i ii

He

$2,000 that the buyet

in 11

i tip*i ii

i I1

i

MII i Hi

the

tnei

ol

[Miid to one of the major

ovMencn

introduced

II I m mil I ill formulate

there was some i.li (I.!

Cleai I t ,

tlie ie < /as

i

Clear I m1 there was sufficient
upon

il M I mil. i I i ed that

Ill Lrimi. .

Il

.it trial

his

findings.

pi in- i. t,.

he

fair market value or the property on September 20, IHH \ ; nowever,
after leaitiiuui nl M

.1 ol I lie repairs actually expended b^

Wasatch Bank, even the expetL witness for the appellants conceded
that thp "iv.i Ki'1 value estimated by Wasatch Bank's appraiser

•s

probably tlju most cor ret I. ,
[T]his Court is constrained to look at the
whole of the evidence in the light favorable
to the trial court's findings, including any
fair inferences to be drawn from, the evidence
and all of the circumstances shown.
The
trial court's findings shall not be disturbed
unless the evidence is such that a 11 reasonable minds would be persuaded to the contrary
Hanover Limited v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977).
il is dtfciti we i i jiecotjrn zed thdl, t actual determinations which
involve property values are strictly within the province
f'K't-finder

and th.-'it" there1* need only be "i reasonable basis in

the evidence tor the Ii inding [with] respect h,i

J<-UUIHJI

.

. . ,

State of Utah v. Tacrcrart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 187 (1967),
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[T]he trier of fact as the exclusive judge of
the credit and weight to be given to the
testimony of witnesses, including expert
witnesses, is the judge of the effect and
value
of
opinion
evidence.
[citation
omitted].
Generally
speaking,
opinion
evidence as to value usually goes no further
than to give the court more or less general
ideas on the subject. From the evidence thus
received, the trial court must draw its own
conclusions of value by a process of balancing
and reconciling, if possible, the varying
opinions.
Whether the opinion as to values is that of
an expert or an owner, the weight to be given
it is largely dependent on the reasons for
the opinion and unless the opinion is wholly
and entirely based on improper considerations
or incompetent matters, the weight to be
given the opinion is a question for the trier
of fact.
City of Gilroy v. Filice, 34 Cal. Rptr. 368, 221 Cal. App. 2d 259
(1963); MCA Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp., 103
Cal. Rptr. 522, 27 Cal. App. 3d 170 (1972).
POINT III
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BY
REASON OF APPELLANTS1 FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
if the court determines that an appeal taken is frivolous, it can
award just damages of single or double costs, including a reasonable attorneys fees, to the prevailing party.
It is respondent•s contention that the appeal undertaken by
the

appellants

rendered

by

the

was

unnecessary

trial

and

court was

frivolous.

clearly

The

predicated
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MI tin-" mush

advantaged position h:j ..issess the credibility of the witnesses,
and,

the testimony offered by the appellants1
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expert

v-.-ness ..ill mot cont licit with the testimony of t hn w 11 nesses for
Wasatch Bank

"The court below committed nn error of law, there

w a s s i g n i f icriiit

HM n U ' i u ' o

iipnn will! i r h I'tin I i i MI I i mil t

I'UII

hi l» i \n

its

decision, and the defendants-appellants simply failed to prevail,
CONCLUSION
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appellant
"as

is"

1.111 iness
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trusteef s
•1
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value
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witness
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on t h e

property

Judge
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Bal I i f ,

Biwth "
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u 11, IIUMSS

niuji i e s

premises ,
as

to

the

date

of

the

trier
I

of

fact,

Il

mure

Appellants" witness admitted to insufficient knowled-

ge regard inq th(=? tcif.il rep] acement 01 cue mechanical systems of
the unit.

.

.

.. . .:;

Clear ' the evidence preponderated in favor or Wasatch Bank,
:

. t 111> duty II| ( he Supreme (Yum I I determine unl y whether

there was sutficient

evidence

to support

trier of fa>^

viewing

^oirt <^rmr>f substitute Its own

^k;.i .

"
~

the findings of the

, a g e d p o s i t :i :::) 1: 1 t D

determine the credibility and weight to be given the evidence.
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WHEREFORE, the respondent respectfully seeks affirmation of
the trial court's ruling and seeks attorneys fees for appellants
frivolous appeal.
DATED this

\y

day of October, 1985.

S. REX LEWIS, a n d ,

&um& g Y ^ M M S
DANIELLE EYER DAVIS, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
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I certify that in the *2\sT day of October, 1985, ten true
and correct copies of the Respondent's Brief was mailed to the
Supreme Court and four true and correct copies of same were
mailed, postage, prepaid, to the following:
Gary L. Chrystler
42 North University Avenue
Suite 4, P.O. box 1045
Provo, Utah 84603
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